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 
Abstract— The protocol for cryptocurrencies can be divided 
into three parts, namely consensus, wallet, and networking over-
lay. The aim of the consensus part is to bring trustless rational 
peer-to-peer nodes to an agreement to the current status of the 
blockchain. The status must be updated through valid transac-
tions. A proof-of-work (PoW) based consensus mechanism has 
been proven to be secure and robust owing to its simple rule and 
has served as a firm foundation for cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Specialized mining devices have emerged, 
as rational miners aim to maximize profit, and caused two prob-
lems: i) the re-centralization of a mining market and ii) the huge 
energy spending in mining. In this paper, we aim to propose a new 
PoW called Error-Correction Codes PoW (ECCPoW) where the 
error-correction codes and their decoder can be utilized for PoW. 
In ECCPoW, puzzles can be intentionally generated to vary from 
block to block, leading to a time-variant puzzle generation 
mechanism. This mechanism is useful in repressing the emergence 
of the specialized mining devices. It can serve as a solution to the 
two problems of recentralization and energy spending. 
Index Terms— Consensus, Cryptocurrency, Blockchain, Proof- 
of-Work, Error-Correction Codes, Hash Functions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n cryptocurrencies, the consensus part plays a role in leading 
an agreement among trustless nodes without any communi-
cations. This part is the most innovative because it can prevent 
the double spending attack [1] in a peer-to-peer network in the 
absence of trusted parties. In Bitcoin [2], as an example, more 
than ten thousand of nodes randomly scattered across the world 
aim to reach a consensus in each block time. The Internet is the 
only way to connect them; communication packets are delayed 
and sometimes dropped though the Internet that is designed to 
provide the best effort service. Cyberattacks frequently happen, 
making transactions over the Internet insecure. Nevertheless, 
Bitcoin has shown secure peer-to-peer transactions over the 
past 10 years. With the help of proof-of-work (PoW) which is 
fundamental to the consensus part, this can be possible. 
In Bitcoin, each node does competitive work, called mining, 
to forge a block. The node which wins this competition has the 
right to mint a specified number of coins as this mining reward. 
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If a node was re-forging all the blocks alone, it could spend the 
total amount of works done to all the mined blocks. 
Without PoW, anybody with a computer can alter the content 
of the blockchain, implying unauthorized changes in any mined 
blocks can be possible. If PoW is attached to each mined block, 
attackers cannot make any unauthorized modifications without 
redoing all the works. No node can alone alter any mined block, 
meaning an immutability property. 
In Bitcoin, miners make rational decisions to maximize their 
profits by following a two stage process in which  i) the miners 
select a blockchain whose length is the longest and ii) they 
extend this longest one by adding a newly mined block. Sup-
pose there are two blockchains where one is longer than the 
other one in terms of the length. Since the longer chain has the 
more accumulated works, altering it is more difficult. This 
longer chain shall be treated the more trustable and preferable 
by the miners. Thus, they select the longer chain. Making such 
a selection is rational for the sake of keeping the mining re-
wards. The mining reward is a delayed conditional payment, 
i.e., if a miner mines a block at a given time point t1, the reward 
is delayed until the future moment t2 of time. This time from t1 
to t2 is measured in terms of the number of blocks, say 100 
blocks. If this mined block was not a part of the longest chain at 
the future time point t2, the reward vanishes. Thus, rational 
miners select the longest chain. 
In Bitcoin, miners spend computational resources to forge a 
block by solving a puzzle carved in a bitcoin program as an on- 
chain policy. This puzzle is made using the secure hash algo-
rithm 256 (SHA256) [3]. To solve the puzzle, the miners have 
to repeatedly execute SHA256 by varying an input to SHA256 
until a good hash is given. This input is the header of the block, 
i.e., block header, including six fields such as version, previous 
hash, difficulty, timestamp and nonce, Merkle tree value. The 
version is fixed. Given a block at a certain height, i.e., the l
th
 
block, the previous hash and the difficulty are obtained from its 
previous block, i.e., (l–1)th block. They are constant. The rest 
varies until SHA256 returns a good hash. A good hash can be 
spotted since it shall possess a certain number of leading zero 
bits reflecting the difficulty. The block header of a mined block 
can serve as the proof that a given puzzle is solved without any 
falsehood. 
Satoshi [2] intended for miners to execute SHA256 using a 
central processing unit (CPU). But, faster computing machines 
based on application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) became 
available. As a result, the miners have chosen to exploit them to 
maximize their profits. To date, the miners equipped with ASIC 
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mining devices have dominated the mining business [4], lead-
ing to two problems: 
M1. The mining markets have become re-centralized [5].  
M2. The electrical energy spent to mine blocks is huge [6]. 
First, the miners have a large portion of the total hash power, 
implying that the plight of the blockchain is left to a handful of 
these influential miners. It can be possible to modify any mined 
blocks on their own rights, leading to shattered trust. Namely, 
they can break the immutability property. Second, new models 
of ASIC mining devices can surpass old models with respect to 
the hash power, which is measured as a hash rate. Each miner is 
forced to buy newer models to win the mining competition. As 
the new models are widely used, the total hash power inevitably 
grows. The difficulty level to solve the puzzle must increase to 
keep a certain predefined range of block generation time that is 
expectedly consumed to mine a single block. Today, this level 
has gotten huge, i.e., O(10
20
) hash rate per second. As a result, 
using CPUs in mining has gotten no longer profitable. Besides, 
as the total hash power increases, the miners spend more and 
more electrical energy to mine blocks. 
If we prevent the usage of ASIC mining, we can alleviate the 
problems M1 and M2. To this end, we use the error-correction 
codes and their decoder. In general, the aim of using the codes 
in modern communication systems is to combat errors occur-
ring over noisy channels in which the errors introduced over a 
noisy channel can be corrected by running a decoding algo-
rithm. The codes have a rich history where there are numerous 
classes of good codes available. They have been used to define 
both a good public-key crypto system and a good hash function. 
The first result can be traced back to the late 1970. McEliece 
[8] used Goppa codes to make a McEliece cryptosystem where 
a message is encoded using a public key :A SGP where G is 
the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code, S is a nonsingular 
random matrix and P is a permutation matrix. The hash, i.e., the 
encoded result, of a provided message is made as follows: a) a 
word is made by multiplying the message with the public key 
and b) adding a binary random word whose number of ones is at 
most t to this word
1
 is to get the hash. Peters et al. [9] extended 
this system using non-binary Goppa codes to reduce the size of 
its public key. Even the size reduces, this system can achieve 
still the same security level as much as that of [8] could. Other 
codes such as low density generator matrix codes [10], low 
density parity check (LDPC) codes [11], [12], Reed-Solomon 
codes [13] and Reed-Muller codes [14] have been used to re-
place the Goppa codes. The aim of using them is to reduce the 
size of the public key. 
Aside from the applications of the error-correction codes into 
the McEliece cryptosystem, the codes are used to construct new 
hash functions. Preneel [15] proposed a method to make new 
hash functions and proved that their hash functions can provide 
strong collision resistant properties. The codes in [15] are either 
the maximum distance separable codes or the Hamming codes. 
 
1 For any Goppa code, there is a construction method to guarantee that the 
minimum distance d of that code is greater than a given positive integer. Thus, 
the value of t can be known in advance using Theorem 1 [32]. 
Selman et al. [16] used LDPC codes to make a hash function 
and proved this function as an average universal hash function 
defined in [17]. These results can motivate us to exploit er-
ror-correction codes in designing a new PoW framework. 
The contributions of this paper are three folds. First, we 
propose a new PoW framework which we name as ECCPoW. 
As the name implies, we add the error-correction code part into 
PoW. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in 
which the error-correction codes are applied to blockchains. 
We then explain how we make puzzles, which we call ECC 
puzzles, and give routines to solve them. 
Second, we conduct a probabilistic study to examine a ran-
dom variable called First Success Hash Cycle (FSHC) repre-
senting the number of hash cycles required in solving a given 
ECC puzzle. Based on this study, we get the following results: 
 FSHC follows a geometric distribution with a parameter in 
(21) that depends on the number of miners M and the code 
length n. 
 The expected value of FSHC is a decreasing function with 
respect to the number of miners M. 
 The expected value of FSHC is an increasing function with 
respect to the code length n. 
Third, we define five properties for a good PoW and explain 
how ECCPoW satisfies these properties. We shall note that the 
most innovative property is the time-variant property, making 
ECCPoW suitable to resolve the problems of recentralization 
and energy spending. 
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section II gives 
literature surveys regarding SHAs and PoWs. Section III elu-
cidates LDPC codes and a decoder. Section IV addresses how 
ECCPoW works and gives its pseudo codes Section V presents 
theoretical results of ECCPoW. Section VI discusses properties 
of ECCPoW. Section VII presents the conclusions of this paper. 
II. LITERATURE ON BLOCKCHAIN CRYPTOGRAPHIES 
A. Secure hash standard and functions  
The secure hash standard was formulated by NIST [3]. The 
purpose of this standard is to offer the specifications of SHAs 
that yield a hash of a given message. Even the message changes 
slightly, the hash of the changed message comes out completely 
different from that of the original message. Thus, a hash can be 
used to detect whether an original message was altered or not. 
SHAs with such a property can be used for the generation and 
the verification of digital signatures as well as for the message 
authentication. 
A secure hash function takes an arbitrarily sized message and 
produces a fixed-size hash. Let a function h be 
 :h   
which is said to be a cryptographically secure hash function if it 
satisfies the three requirements defined in [17] below: 
(One-way function) Given any hash y to which a corresponding 
message is not known, it is computationally infeasible to find a 
message x such that h(x) = y. 
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(Weak collision resistance) Given an arbitrary message x, it is 
computationally infeasible to find any message x’ which results 
in the same hash, i.e., h(x) = h(x’). 
(Strong collision resistance) It is computationally infeasible to 
find any two different messages x and x’ which make the same 
hashes h(x) = h(x’). 
NIST [3] has proposed a family of SHAs including SHA1, 
SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512. A message of any 
size less than 2
64
 bits can be given as an input for SHA1, 
SHA224, and SHA256, while that of less than 2
128
 bits for 
SHA384 and SHA512. The size of a hash ranges from 160 to 
512 bits, depending on the algorithm.  
B. PoW of Bitcoin 
In Table I, we define a puzzle in Bitcoin and give routines to 
solve this puzzle. In Step 2, a miner puts a given block header 
with a selected nonce to SHA256 and obtain a hash of 256-bits. 
In Step 3, this puzzle is declared to be solved if a hash is smaller 
than a specified target value, or in a simpler argument it begins 
with L zero bits, where the target value or the value of L is given 
as the difficulty level of the PoW puzzle. The miner repeats the 
routines from Step 2 to Step 3 by varying the nonce. However, 
there exists a chance in which the miner can fail to hit a good 
hash even though the whole range of nonces, i.e., 0 ~ 2
32
 – 1, is 
used. In such a case, the miner updates the block header, and 
repeats the routines from Step 2 and Step 3. There are two 
methods to update the block header. The first one is to update 
the timestamp field. The second one is to update the Merkle tree 
value by modifying the list of transactions being included in a 
block which the miner aims to construct. 
C. PoW of Ethereum 
Ethash [18] was created for the purpose of preventing the 
advent of ASIC mining devices in Ethereum. In Ethash, there is 
a memory structure called directed acyclic graph (DAG) where 
its data are randomly re-generated every 30,000 block. 
Table II shows routines of Ethash. As we have shown in Step 
2, the current block header with a nonce is taken by SHA3 to 
get a hash. This hash is taken by a predefined function to yield 
mix0 that is random. In Step 4, mix0 is used to determine which 
data from DAG are fetched. No one predicts which data shall be 
fetched from DAG because mix0 is random. The mixer takes 
both the fetched data and mix0 to get a random value in Step 5. 
In Step 6, mix0 is updated using the random value. The routines 
from Step 2 to Step 6 are repeated 63 times. Last, the decision is 
made using this final mix0, as we have shown in Step 8. 
The ASIC resistant property in Ethash is originated from the 
fact that the operation time for the mixer is shorter than that of 
the fetch operation. To be specific, let Ai be the time duration 
(TD) to conduct the mixing operation in which the subscript i 
denotes a chip to run this mixing operation. It is clear that the 
mixing operation TD based on an ASIC chip is significantly 
less than that based on any CPU chip because the clock speed of 
an ASIC chip is much faster than that of any CPU chip, i.e.,  
 
ASIC CPUA A .  
Next, let Bi be the TD to conduct the fetch operation. Unlike to 
the mixing operation TD, this TD depends on the communica-
tions bandwidth between the memory and the cache of the CPU 
in which the fetched data from DAG are passed through. In 
other words, the fetch operation time is connected mainly to the 
bandwidth but not to the clock speed. The purpose to use ASIC 
chips is to increase the processing speed; is not for obtaining a 
higher communications bandwidth. The fetch operation TD for 
CPU and ASIC are thus similar, i.e., 
 
ASIC CPUB B .  
We consider the inner routines of Ethash, i.e., Step 4 and Step 5. 
The mixing operation is conducted after the fetching operation 
is done. This operation TD at Step 4 can be significantly re-
duced using ASIC chips; but the fetching operation TD at Step 
5 is not reduced even if ASCI chips are used. As a result, there 
is a bottleneck between Step 4 and Step 5. This bottleneck has 
the ASIC resistant property enabled. 
Recently, a programmatic PoW (ProgPoW), which is plan-
ning to be used to replace Ethash, has been proposed to further 
improve the ASIC resistant property. This improvement is done 
by changing parameters related to DAG randomly from block 
to block. Such modifications can make the fetch operation time 
increased. But, the development of ProgPoW is not completed 
and ProgPoW is not proven to be secure at the time of writing 
this manuscript. 
D. PoW of Dash 
X11 was proposed in 2014 by Duffield [19]. In Table III, we 
give routines of X11 which consists of hash functions below: 
Blake, Bmw, Groestl, Jh, Keccak, Skein, Luffa, Cubehash, 
Shavite, Simd and Echo. 
TABLE I. The routine of bitcoin 
Inputs: 0 (block header except for nonce)  and L 
Step 1: for nonce = 0, 1, 2, … 232 – 1 
Step 2:   0SHA256 noncee  
Step 3:  If e begins with L zero bits, then go to Step 5. 
Step 4: end 
Step 5: Block generation & broadcast 
 
TABLE II. The routine of Ethash 
Inputs: 0 (block header except for nonce), L and DAG 
Step 1: for nonce = 0, 1, 2, … 232 – 1 
Step 2:    0mix0 SHA3 noncef  
Step 3:  for i = 1, 2, …, 63 
Step 4:          data1 Fetch DAG,mix0  
Step 5:              tmp Mixing mix0,data1  
Step 6:  mix0 tmpf  
Step 7:      end 
Step 8: If mix0 begins with L zero bits, then go to Step 10. 
Step 9:  end 
Step 10:  Block generation & broadcast 
where f is a predefined function. Details on f  is given in [18]. 
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Blake first takes a given set of the current the block header 
with a selected nonce to get its hash. Next, Bmw takes this hash 
as its input to yield a hash. The same procedures are repeated 
until Echo, the last hash function, yields its hash. The decision 
is made using this last hash, as we have shown in Step 13. 
However, the order of using the 11 hash functions is always 
fixed. This fixed order makes the development of ASIC mining 
devices possible and in fact an easy task. The development of 
ASIC mining solution can be done when these hash functions 
are implemented in a single device. Logic gates to sequentially 
connect the hash functions can be implemented. The first ASIC 
mining device targeting X11 was developed in 2016. 
The idea behind X11 has been extended to other PoWs such 
as X13, X15, and X17. As the names suggest, they consists of 
13, 15, and 17 hash functions, respectively. To date, there a set 
of ASIC mining devices for both X13 and X15 while there is no 
ASIC mining device yet for X17.  
E. PoW of Raven 
In 2018, a new extension of X11 was proposed in [20]. This 
is called X16r. It uses multiple hash functions given in Table IV 
to get the last hash like to other extensions of X11 that we have 
discussed in Section II D. But, unlike the others, the sequence 
of the hash functions in X16r can be made to vary from block to 
block. This variation seems to be a role for preventing the ad-
vent of ASIC mining devices for X16r. 
We provide an example to address how X16r operates. The 
sequence X16r is determined upon the last 16 bytes of a pre-
vious hash. Let this previous hash be 
0x0000...04def2c3eff6da11542ffcdabce. 
The last 16 bytes are 6da11542ffcdabce. Then, the sequence is 
decided on the basis of Table IV below: 
Luffa → Shabal → Echo → Bmw → Bmw → Skein → Keccak 
→ Groestl → Sha512 → Sha512 → Fugue → Shabal → Echo 
→ Hamsi → Fugue → Whirlpool. 
A miner puts a given set of the block header with a selected 
nonce through Luffa to yield a hash. Shabal takes this hash as 
its input to yield its hash. This routine is repeated until the last 
hash is yielded. In the above example, the last hash is obtained 
through Whirlpool. 
At the time of writing this manuscript, it seems, no one has 
officially succeeded in implementing ASIC mining devices for 
X16r, i.e., there is no announced commercial product. However, 
Black and Weight, the developers of X16r, in [20] stated that 
reordering the sequence cannot make the development of ASIC 
mining devices impossible. Recently, in [33] at Nov., 2019, 
Whitefire990 reported a simulation result which indicates the 
probability of k time-repetition, such that the same hash func-
tion is used at least 5 times consecutively when k is 5, expo-
nentially decreases in k. Insisted further is that k greater than 5 
can be ignored in designing of ASIC mining devices. As such, 
what claimed there is that the ASIC-resistant property of Raven 
can be broken by the said ASIC designing method. It shall be 
noted, however, that all these claims provided in [33] have not 
yet been carefully verified through a peer-review system.  
F. Short summary from C to E 
From the subsection II.C to II.E, we have reviewed the ex-
isting ASIC-resistant PoWs categorized as follows: 
a. The usage of intentional memory access. 
b. The usage of multiple hash functions. 
Ethash and ProgPoW can belong to the first class while X11 
and its variants such as X13, X15, X17 and X16r can belong to 
the second class. The basic idea of the first class is to use the 
bottleneck intentionally caused by randomly fetching data from 
a memory. The basic idea of the second one is to use the mul-
tiple hash functions, which can make the development costs of 
ASIC mining devices expensive. 
At the time of writing this manuscript, ASIC mining devices 
for Ethash, X11, X13 and X15 are available. The development 
of ProgPoW is not yet available. X17 and X16r can be resistant 
to ASIC mining devices. But, as the ASIC-resistant property of 
the PoWs such as X11, X13 and X15 are broken, that of X17 
can be cracked in the near future when the hardware develop-
ment technology is improved. As mentioned in the subsection 
II.E, there is a claim that the anti-ASIC property of X16r could 
be broken; but to date no commercial ASIC mining device has 
been announced. 
III. Literature Surveys on LDPC 
An LDPC decoder plays an important role in ECCPoW. That 
is, the decoder is utilized to generate an unpredictable random 
output that can be later on used to give a proof whether a puzzle 
is solved or not. We prepare this section to give a quick sum-
mary regarding the LDPC codes and their decoders. 
In 1963, LDPC codes were proposed by Gallager in his the-
sis [7]. But, the codes received no attention back then because 
computers were not sufficiently fast enough to check the per-
TABLE III. The routine of X11 
Inputs: 0 (block header except for nonce)  and L 
Step 1: for nonce = 0, 1, 2, … 232 – 1 
Step 2:   0 noncee Blake  
Step 3:  e eBmw  
  …. 
Step 12:  Echoe e  
Step 13:  If e begins with L zero bits, then go to Step 15. 
Step 14: end 
Step 15: Block generation & broadcast 
 
TABLE IV. The map for X16r  
Value Hash Value Hash 
0 Blake 8 Shavite 
1 Bmw 9 Simd 
2 Groestl a Echo 
3 Jh b Hamsi 
4 Keccak c Fugue 
5 Skein d Shabal 
6 Luffa e Whirlpool 
7 Cubehash f Sha512 
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formance of a decoder. Mackay and Neal [22] reported in 1997 
that the codes could achieve the Shannon limit [21] closely with 
a message passing decoder that uses a kind of belief propaga-
tion algorithms. Since then, numerous studies on the codes have  
been made. They are categorized as follows: i) constructing the 
codes to approach the Shannon limit [21] and ii) implementing 
the fast decoders based on either ASIC [23]–[26] or field pro-
grammable gate array (FPGA) [27]–[28] to support real-time 
decoding purpose. 
A. LDPC codes 
LDPC codes can be generalized to a non-binary alphabet for 
improving its error-correction capability. But, for the purpose 
of using these codes in ECCPoW to provide a new time-varying 
anti-ASIC PoW system, it hence is suffice to consider the bi-
nary alphabet version only. 
An (n, k) LDPC code is a linear code constructed by sup-
plementing each message m of size k with parity bits to get a 
codeword of size n. This code is often defined with respect to a 
parity check matrix H of size m × n such that each element is 
binary either zero or one and the number of ones is very small, 
where m is the number of parity bits, i.e., m = n – k. 
For a given parity check matrix H, its corresponding LDPC 
code can be either regular or irregular. If H contains a constant 
number wc, called the column degree, of ones in each column 
and a constant number wr, called the row degree, of 1s in each 
row, the code is called regular. For a given regular LDPC code, 
the parameters such as n, k, wc, and wr satisfy the following: 
   .c r rnw n k w mw    (1) 
If H contains a different number of 1s in both each column and 
each row, the code is called irregular. In the perspective of the 
error-correction capability, irregular codes are better than reg-
ular codes. To serve our purpose of anti-ASIC PoW mechanism, 
we aim to consider the regular LDPC codes because 
i. it is much easier to implement a decoder of regular LDPC 
codes and 
ii. the aim of using this decoder is not to correct errors but to 
yield an unpredictable random output. 
A bipartite graph is often used to represent an LDPC code, as 
we have shown in Fig. 1. The lower and upper nodes are called 
the variable nodes and the check nodes, respectively. Each edge 
shows the adjacency of the i
th
 variable node and the j
th
 check 
node and corresponds to a nonzero (i, j)
th
 element in H. 
For a given LDPC code, its error-correction capability relies 
on the minimum (Hamming) distance d. This distance is given 
by solving an optimization problem in which we consider any 
pair of 2
k
 – 1 different codewords below: 
 
 1 2 2, , , \
min
k n
h
d


u c c c 0
u  (2) 
which is NP-complete, where 
h
x is the number of 1s in x. 
Thus far, studies on the computation of a good approxima-
tion to minimum distance for a given fixed H with reasonable 
size have been reported futile and as such it has remained as an 
open problem. Keha and Duman [29] proposed a branch and cut 
algorithm to obtain the minimum distance of LDPC codes. But, 
this algorithm requires a large amount of time and memory; it is 
thus only useful if n is small. Then, Hashemi and Banihashemi 
[30] proposed a method to find lower and upper bounds of the 
minimum distance of LDPC codes and obtained both of the 
bounds even when n > 64,000. 
For regular LDPC codes with a particular pair of wc and wr, 
upper and lower bounds for a relative minimum distance which 
is the ratio of the minimum distance d to the code length n, are 
given in [31] and [7], respectively. We use them for our purpose 
in this paper in Section IV. Once the minimum distance is given, 
the number of correctable errors can be computed as follows: 
Theorem 1 [32]: Let a linear code be defined as a given parity 
check matrix H which has the minimum distance d. Then, the 
number of correctable errors is 
  1 2t d     (3) 
where x    denotes the integer part of x. 
We explain how to encode a message m for a given H of size 
m × n. To this end, we build a generator matrix G of size n × k 
whose column space is orthogonal to the row space of H below: 
Step 1: Conduct the Gaussian elimination to rewrite H as 
follows: 
 T n k   H A I  
where In–k is the identity matrix of size (n – k) × (n – k). 
Step 2: Form G of size n × k as follows: 
 .
k 
  
 
I
G
A
 
It is noted that ,n k kHG 0  where ,n k k0  is the zero matrix of 
size (n – k) × k. Note again m = n – k. The message m is encoded 
to produce a codeword c of size n × 1 via c = Gm. Then, be-
cause of the definition of G, it is always seen that the result of 
multiplying H with c is the zero vector of size m, i.e.,  
 .m Hc HGm 0  
A decoder takes both the parity check matrix H and the 
corrupted word r, which is r = c + e, where e is an error pattern. 
The decoder runs a message-passing algorithm [32] shown to 
be the standard decoding algorithm to remove e. 
The principle behind the message-passing algorithm is to 
iteratively propagate probabilistic information among the var-
iable and check nodes. The iterations are terminated if either the 
number of iterations exceeds a given number or an output is a 
codeword. Detailed explanations on how this algorithm oper-
ates are provided in [32], i.e., Algorithm 5.1 on page 220. The 
algorithm takes parameters such as H, r, maxIter, and ε, where 
maxIter is the number of maximum iterations, and ε is the cross 
error probability that is used to determine the initial value of the 
algorithm. 
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The error-correction performance of the algorithm depends 
on both maxIter and the crossover error probability. If maxIter 
is small, the algorithm fails to obtain a converged solution. If it 
is large, the algorithm may take a considerably long computa-
tional time to obtain its solution. In the literature, maxIter is set 
from 10 to 20 in general. Next, the crossover error probability is 
set if the transition probability of a binary symmetric channel is 
either given or estimated. If this is improperly set, the decoding 
performance is degraded, leading to the poor error-correction 
capability. For the purpose in correcting errors, this parameter 
must be carefully considered. 
The aim of using the decoder in ECCPoW, please make note 
of the fact that, is not to correct errors. Thus, there is no need to 
set maxIter and ε strictly. One condition that we shall aim to 
satisfy is that all the miners in ECCPoW system have to use the 
same values for these parameters. This condition can be easily 
satisfied by letting them to be published fixed constants in the 
proposed implemented program. As the miners verify a newly 
published block before accepting it, there is no benefit not to 
follow and use different ones for these published parameters. 
That is, any proof obtained from arbitrary parameters other than 
the published ones must be rejected. 
We will give details on how to construct the other parameters, 
such as H and r, in Section IV. 
B. FPGA and ASIC Implementation 
LDPC decoders based on ASIC, a.k.a. ASIC-LDPC decoders 
are implemented to achieve low power consumption and fast 
processing. In the decoders, the check and variable nodes have 
to be physically connected using logical gates for a given parity 
check matrix. Fixed connections are to imply limited flexibility 
on the designs on the ASIC-LDPC decoders, making them only 
to support either a set of pre-defined parity check matrices or 
structured parity check matrices. We give our surveys related to 
existing ASIC-LDPC decoders as follows. 
First, the ASIC-LDPC decoder in [23] supports quasi-cyclic 
parity check matrices decomposed into cyclic-shifted identity 
and zero matrices. These matrices have the same structure that 
is used in implementing the decoder. Second, the ASIC-LDPC 
decoder in [24] supports the parity check matrices included in 
the IEEE 802.16e system. These matrices are fixed; not change. 
Third, in [25], Hanzo et al., reviewed the state-of-the-art of 
ASIC-LDPC decoders and stated that these decoders must take 
a bank of hardware to support many random parity check ma-
trices. Namely, additional components such as memories, con-
trollers and switchable interconnections are required, resulting 
in that these components occupy the most chip area in the de-
coders. They supported their statement by providing an exam-
ple of [26] in which the ASIC-LDPC decoder supports about 
100 parity check matrices, but its additional components oc-
cupy 75% of the total area of the decoder. This shows that there 
are no practical implementations on ASIC-LDPC decoders to 
support an infinite number of random parity check matrices. 
There are FPGA-LDPC decoders that are the LDPC decod-
ers implemented on FPGA chips. FPGA-LDPC decoders con-
sume more power rather than ASIC-LPDC decoders do. But, it 
is much easier to reprogram the FPGA-LDPC decoders, which 
implies that they can achieve the more flexibility on the designs 
compared to ASIC-LDCP decoders. The FPGA-LDPC decoder 
in [27] supports parity check matrices up to n = 65,000. But, it 
is required to load a parity check matrix onto this decoder when 
it has to be changed, requiring additional time. In [28], Hanzo et 
al., stated that FPGA-LDPC decoders require additional routing 
and processing devices to support many parity check matrices. 
But, as they pointed, the use of these additional devices can lead 
to complex designs, increasing the cost of the decoders.  
IV. ERROR-CORRECTION CODES PROOF OF WORK 
In this section, we give details on ECCPoW. For simplicity, 
we organize this section into four subsections. In the first sub-
section, we list fields belonging to a block header of ECCPoW 
and provide their simple explanations. In the second subsection, 
we illustrate an overall structure of ECCPoW and its explana-
tions. In the third subsection, we explain how we construct two 
inputs that appear as we use a decoder of error-correction codes. 
In the last subsection, we give the definition of an ECC puzzle 
generation function and present how to define an ECC puzzle 
using this ECC function. We end the last subsection by giving  
routines for solving this ECC puzzle. 
A. Block header in ECCPoW 
The block header of ECCPoW is defined to be a data struc-
ture that has eight fields such as timestamp, Merkle tree value, 
previous hash value, nonce, version, code length, row degree 
and column degree. 
We use the fields such as version, timestamp, previous hash 
value, Merkle tree value and nonce to achieve in the purpose of 
guaranteeing the immutability property similar to Bitcoin. 
We use the remains such as the code length, the row degree 
and the column degree to assign the size of hash vector and 
parity check matrix (PCM), which appears due to the usage of a 
decoder of a family of LDPC codes. As we will show in Section 
V, we change the difficulty level of a puzzle by varying the 
code length if the column degree and the row degree are fixed. 
B. Overall structure of ECCPoW 
Fig. 1 is prepared to present an overall structure of ECCPoW. 
This structure consists of three parts such as i) the hash vector 
generation (HVG) part, ii) the LDPC decoder part and iii) the 
decision part. We explain each part as follows. 
In the HVG part, we randomly generate a hash vector of size 
n using a series of SHA256s taking the CBH with a given nonce 
generated by the nonce generator. The details how to generate 
this hash vector from the knowledge of the CBH will be given 
in the subsection IV.C. 
In the LDPC decoder part, there is a decoder from a family of 
LDPC codes. This decoder takes the above hash vector and runs 
the message-passing algorithm [32] to yield a binary word c. It 
is noted that this decoder takes a parity check matrix (PCM) H 
determining the relation between an input and its corresponding 
output. The details how to construct this PCM will be given in 
the subsection IV.C. 
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Last, in the decision part, the decision is made on the basis of 
the output provided by the decoder, as we have shown in Fig. 1.  
C. Construction of hash vector and parity check matrix in 
ECCPoW 
First, we provide the definition of hash vector r and give how 
we construct this hash vector using the current block header. 
Definition 1 – Hash Vector: A hash vector r, which is a vector 
of concatenating outputs of SHA256s, of size n is defined to be: 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1: if 256
:
1: if 256l l
n n
j n
 
 
   
s
r
s s s
  (4) 
where 256l n    ,  j = n – 256 × l,  
    
256
1 : SHA256 CBH 0,1 s  (5) 
and  
    
256
1: SHA256 0,1u  s s  (6) 
where u = 2, 3, …, l + 1 and CBH is the current block header. 
The current block header represented to be CBH in (5) is the 
on-chain information that is stored in the Internet. Anyone thus 
can access this on-chain information, leading to that anyone can 
make the same hash vector that a miner made during his mining 
competition work. 
Second, we give a construction method of PCM for a given 
previous hash. This construction method has to be designed to 
satisfy two conditions: 
C1. Any verifier can reconstruct the PCM using on-chain 
information that the miner has used. 
C2. Formation of a PCM can vary from block to block. 
First, suppose that C1 is not met. One choice a miner can opt 
out is to include a constructed PCM in a block for making any 
verifier to check the validity of this block. This may result in, 
under the condition that the block size is fixed, reducing the 
number of transactions stored in the block. Second, suppose C2 
is not met. We then remind the literature survey given in Sec-
tion III. This survey is to indicate that developing ASIC-LDPC 
decoders for supporting a single PCM can be possible. Thus, if 
C2 is not satisfy, there is a possibility to develop ASIC mining 
devices. Thus, C1 and C2 must be satisfied simultaneously. 
Now, we begin to explain the proposed construction method 
that can satisfy C1 and C2. First, we let you know that the PCM 
parameters such as the code length n, the row degree wr and the 
column degree wc are essentially required to construct a PCM H. 
More concretely, if they are provided, we can assign the value 
of m, the number of rows of H in (1). These parameters are 
included in the block header, as we have stated in the second 
paragraph in this section. 
 The proposed method is based on the method of Gallager [7]. 
This aims to construct H that can be decomposed into a set of 
sub-matrices of size wc×n as follows: 
 
 
 
 
1
1
0,1
c
r
c
nw
n
w
w




 
 
  
 
 
  
A
A
H
A
                    (7) 
where  i A  is the i
th
 submatrix constructed by random per-
 
Fig. 1. An overall scheme of ECCPoW. 
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mutation of the columns of A, 
i  is the i
th
 permutation order, 
and 
  : 0,1
r
c
r
w
w n
w

 
 
  
 
 
1
A
1
 
whose the i
th
 row has 
cw 1s in a row from (i  – 1)×wr to i×wr and 
   1: 1 1 1 .r
r
w
w
 1 1  
Let wc, wr and n are fixed. Different PCM can be constructed 
by varying the permutation orders, leading to the serial creation 
of different PCMs. To come up with different random permu-
tation from block to block, we use a previous hash. Namely, we 
let PBHV be assumed to be an array of 32 bytes to represent the 
given previous hash. We generate an initial seed value S below 
      : PBHV 0 PBHV 1 PBHV 31S       (8) 
where PBHV[i] is the i
th
 element of PBHV. The first permuta-
tion order is generated using a seed value S. The i
th
 permutation 
order is then generated using S – i + 1. The pseudo code of this 
construction method of PCM is given in Table VI. 
We explain how the pseudo code given in Table VI can sat-
isfy the conditions C1 and C2 mentioned earlier. In Step 4, the 
i
th
 permutation order is constructed using S – 1 + i. Any verifier 
can get the same value S without any communications because 
PBHVs are on-chain information and thus available within the 
chain. Thus, the verifiers can easily reconstruct what the miner 
has constructed in the past, which confirms that the proposed 
method satisfies C1. Second, PBHVs are hashes and thus pos-
sess the characteristics of random numbers; i.e., the initial seed 
value is a random number. All of the permutation orders are 
provided using the initial seed value. Thus, the orders vary from 
block to block, which confirms that the proposed method sat-
isfies C2 as well.  
D. Construction of ECC puzzle generation functions and ECC 
puzzles 
Let the current block header (CBH) except nonce be given. 
We define an ECC puzzle generation function by concatenating 
the HVG part and the decoder part. 
Definition 3 – ECC puzzle generation function: Let the current 
block header (CBH) except nonce be given. For this given CBH, 
an ECC puzzle generation function (ECCPGF) is defined to be 
a composite function as follows: 
    
1
CBH : nonce 0,1
n
h

c  (9) 
where c is the output of a decoder defined in Definition 4. 
Definition 4 – Decoder: A decoder takes both the hash vector r 
in (4) and the PCM H in (7) as its inputs and runs the message 
passing algorithm given in [32] to yield a vector c of size n: 
    
1
: , 0,1 .
n
MP

r H c  (10) 
When the CBH with a selected nonce is given, we can make 
a hash vector r according to (4). Using the previous hash value 
included in the CBH, we can make a PCM H as well. The de-
coder then takes both of them to yield the binary word, as we 
have shown in (10). This binary word is the output of ECCPGF, 
as we have shown in (9) 
A mapping rule in the LDPC decoder depends on the form of 
H. As we have discussed in the subsection IV.C, we can choose 
to vary H from block to block. As blocks are mined endlessly, 
infinitely many PCMs can be made. Thus, as we have men-
tioned in the subsection III.B, this can deter the development of 
an ASIC-LDPC decoder. Making ASIC chips to function as an 
ECCPGF becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus, 
we use this ECCPGF to define an ECC puzzle as follows. 
Definition 5 – ECC Puzzle: An ECC puzzle constructed using a 
given ECCPGF defined in (9) is defined to be 
 find  subject to ( ) .CBH mnonce h nonce H 0  (11) 
Namely, this puzzle is a problem where we aim to find a nonce 
satisfying the constraint given in (11). 
We shall note that this puzzle can be time-variant from block 
to block and resistant to ASIC chips. We will provide details in 
Section VI. 
Last, we provide codes to solve a puzzle in Table V. In Step 1, 
a nonce is selected from 0 to 2
32
 – 1. We construct a hash vector 
r using (4), as we have shown in Step 2. In Step 3, we execute 
the decoder to give an output by taking both r and H. The de-
cision is done using this output in Step 4. If the output is not a 
codeword, we repeat the routines from Step 1 to Step 4. Similar 
to Bitcoin, there is a case in which we cannot find the solution 
even we consider the whole nonces. In such a case, we modify 
the fields such as timestamp and Merkle tree value of the cur-
rent block header. This modification can lead to the variation of 
the hash vector (4). We then repeat the whole routines with this 
modified block header. 
TABLE V. The pseudo codes for ECCPoW 
Inputs: CBH and PCM H 
Step 1: A nonce is uniformly chosen from [0, 232 – 1 ] 
Step 2: 
Construct a HV r using (4) with a chosen nonce and the given 
CBH. 
Step 3: Obtain a vector c using (10) with the given PCM H. 
Step 4: If the constraint in (11) is satisfied, then go to Step 5.  
Step 5: Block generation & broadcast 
 
TABLE VI. The pseudo codes to construct PCM 
Inputs: n, wc, wr and BHV  
Output: H 
Step 1: Construct S using (8). 
Step 2: Construct A by following the statements below (7) and H = A. 
Step 3: for i = 2 to wc – 1 
Step 4: Construct i  with the seed value S – i + 1. 
Step 5:   .
T
i   
H H A  
Step 6: end 
Step 7: .TH H  
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V. ANALYSIS ON ERROR-CORRECTION CODES PROOF OF 
WORK 
To solve an ECC puzzle, we repeat the routines from Step 1 
to Step 4 many times until finding a nonce that satisfies the 
constraint in (11). A simple question such that what is the 
number of trials for finding this nonce naturally arises. To this 
end, we conduct a probabilistic study for giving answers to the 
following three questions: 
Q1. What is the number of hash cycles needed to solve a 
given puzzle? 
Q2. Which are the parameters which affect the number of 
hash cycles needed? 
Q3. How does the number of miners affect the number of 
hash cycles needed? 
We define the hash cycle, the success event, and the mining 
game, respectively. 
Definition 6 – Hash Cycle: The single execution of the whole 
routines from Step 1 to Step 4 given in Table V is defined to be 
single hash cycle. 
Definition 7 – Success Event: A success event occurs if a nonce 
such that the decoder defined in (10)  can return a codeword is 
found, i.e., the constraint in (11) is satisfied. 
Definition 8 – Mining Game: Let both a PCM H of size m × n 
and a CBH except for nonce be given. There are M miners, and 
each use a single computer with the same computing capacity. 
A mining game (MG) 
  MG ,CBH, ,M pH  (12) 
is defined that the miners compete with each other in a race to 
hit the success event first. We let p be the decoding success (DS) 
probability of the decoder for this given PCM H, i.e., 
  : Pr : mp  r Hc 0  (13) 
where c is the output of the decoder defined in (10). 
For a given PCM H of size m × n, there are 2
k
 codewords: 
  1 2 3 2, , , , .kc c c c  
Then, we define a sphere set for the given i
th
 codeword 
     , : 0,1 ni i hl l  c r r c r   
whose cardinality is 
  
0
,
0 1 2
s
i l
n n n n n
l
l l
         
              
         
c   
where s is a positive integer and 
h
x is the number of 1s in x. 
We assume that the decoder defined in (10) is optimal, im-
plying that it can correct up to t errors where t is obtained by (3). 
The decoder always yields the i
th
 codeword when it takes an 
input belonging to the ith sphere, i.e., 
  : ,MP ir H c  
where  , .i tr c  Then, we have 
 
   
  
2 2
1 1 0
2
1
Pr Pr
Pr ,
k k
k
t
i i hi i l
ii
p l
t
  

    
 
  

c c r c
r c
 (14) 
where c is an output of the decoder which takes a hash vector r. 
Since the number of inputs that can be mapped into one of the 
codewords is 
  
2
1
, ,
k
ii
t
 c  
the DS probability p can be expressed as follows:  
    
12
2
0
1
2 , 2 , 2
k d
n k n k n
i i l
i
n
p t t
l
 
     


 
    
 
 c c  (15) 
where the third equality comes from (3). 
Intuitively, the number of trials increases as p decreases. It is 
natural to find which parameters make effects on p. To this end, 
we establish Proposition 1 to provide the behavior of p in terms 
of the code length n under the assumption that the row degree 
and the column degree are fixed. 
Proposition 1 – Let wc ≥ 3, wr > wc be fixed constants and their 
ratio be a fixed constant as well 
  : 0,1c rw w   . (16) 
Let the size of a given PCM H be m × n. For any  0 < δ < 1/2, we 
have 
 
  2
2 2
n Hn p
       (17) 
where H(x) is the binary entropy function defined as follows: 
      2 2log 1 log 1 .H x x x x x       
Indeed, let the ratio further satisfy the following: 
   0.25 ,1 .H   (18) 
Then, the DS probability p vanishes with increase in n. 
Proof: From (1) with (16), we infer that 
 .k n n    (19) 
The results [7] state that the minimum distance of any regular 
LDPC code with constant wr and wc ≥ 3 can linearly increase 
with increase in n. This statement indicates that the distance can 
be expressed as for any 0 < δ < 1/2, 
 .d n      
Substituting (19) into (15) leads to an upper bound to p 
 
  2 2
2
0
2 2 2 2
n
n
n
n Hk n k n nH
l
n
p
l


 
   
  
 
  
  

 
   
 
  (20) 
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where the second inequality comes from the fact that any in-
tegers 1n k  with 0.5k n   
 
 
0
2 .
k nH k n
l
n
l
 
 
 
   
By assuming t = 0 in (14), the lower bound is obtained below: 
    2 , 2 ,0 2 2 .k n k n k n ni ip t
      c c   
Last, let the ratio satisfy (18). Then, the term of the exponent in 
the upper bound in (17) is negative because for any 0 < δ < 1/2, 
   2 0.25H H  . 
Thus, increasing n makes the upper bound on p reduced. This 
leads to that p vanishes as n goes to infinity.                            ■ 
We provide quick discussions on Proposition 1. First, for the 
fixed constant α, decreasing the code length n makes the lower 
bound on the DS probability p grow. Second, if we select any 
pairs of wc and wr which can satisfy (18), then p vanishes as n 
increases. This means that no one solves an ECC puzzle using 
these pairs for sufficiently large n. We thus have to avoid se-
lecting such pairs for preventing this critical problem. 
We define a random variable to represent the number of hash 
cycles required to end a MG and provide its statistical proper-
ties, respectively. 
Definition 8 – Random Variable: For a given MG, X
M
 is de-
fined as a random variable that represents the number of hash 
cycles to end this given MG, where the subscript M denotes the 
number of miners forging simultaneously and independently. 
We call this random variable First Success Hash Cycle (FSHC). 
Theorem 2 – Let an MG{H, CBH, M, p} be given. Then the 
distribution that FSHC occurs at the l
th
 hash cycle is 
    1f,a f,aPr X 1lM l p p     
which is a geometric distribution with a parameter 
  f,a1 p  (21) 
where  f,a : 1
M
p p   is the probability that all of the miners 
fail to succeed in solving a given puzzle. Then, we have 
    
1
f,aX 1M p

   (22) 
and 
    
2
f,a f,aX 1 .M p p

    
Proof: The proof is clear, as XM follows the geometric distri-
bution with (21). We thus omit it.                                             ■ 
For the constant α defined in (16), Proposition 1 shows that 
the DS probability p grows with decrease in the code length n. 
When p grows, the parameter (21) reduces and converges to a 
real positive number. Thus, the expected value gets reduced and 
converges to a number, implying that an ECC puzzle becomes 
easier as n gets smaller. 
Next, we consider a case in which n grows. In this case, the 
upper bound given in (17) is too loose to be considered unless α 
satisfies (18). Thus, we require another upper bound on p which 
is tighter than the previous upper bound. To this end, we invoke 
a table of [31]. For a certain pair of the column degree wc and 
the row degree wr, this table was obtained and given in the form 
of an upper bound δ1 to the relative minimum distance δ0, the 
ratio of the minimum distance d to the code length n. For wc = 4 
and wr = 5, for example, the upper bound is 0.3238. For wc = 4 
and wr = 8, it is 0.1765. The result was obtained from an as-
ymptotic analysis; i.e., by letting n go to infinity. 
We use the upper bound δ1 to obtain a tighter bound on the 
DS probability p as follows: 
  1, ,p g n k   (22) 
where δ1 is given in the table of [31] for a certain pair of wc and 
wr and 
  
1
2
0
, , : 2 .
n
k n
l
n
g n k
l


   
 
   

 
  
 
  
The bound in (22) is obtained by simply replacing the minimum 
distance with the upper bound, respectively: 
 0 1: .d n n       
Once the upper bound on p has been obtained, we can use it 
to find a lower bound to the expected value of FSHC below:  
 
  
 
1
1
X
1 1 , ,
MM
g n k 

 
 (23) 
We can examine the behavior of (22) with respect to the code 
length n and the number of miners M. In Table VII, we provide 
the lower bounds to the expected value by varying either n or M. 
They are obtained for a case in which the column degree wc and 
the row degree wr are 4 and 5, respectively. We can see that the 
lower bound increases with increase in n for the fixed M. That 
is, it increases from 1.58 × 10
4
 to 2.46 × 10
4
 when n is increased 
from 80 to 160. This result implies that increasing n makes an 
ECC puzzle more difficult to solve. For the other pairs of wc 
and wr given in [31], the same result is observed.  
Now, for the fixed code length n, we consider the behavior of 
the expected value of FSHC by growing the number of miners 
M. Intuitively, as more miners are involved in solving a given 
puzzle, this puzzle has to end early. In addition, if an infinite 
number of miners work, any MG has to end at the 1
st
 hash cycle. 
These intuitions can be confirmed by Corollary 1 given below. 
TABLE VII. The lower bound given in (23)  
wc = 4 and wr = 5 M = 1 M = 5 M =20 
Lower bounds, i.e., δ1 = 0.3238 in (23) 
n = 80 ,  k = 12 1.58×104 0.31×104 0.08×104 
n = 120 , k = 24 6.03×107 1.20×107 0.30×107 
n = 160 , k = 32 2.46×109 0.49×109 0.12×109 
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Corollary 1: Let a MG{H, CBH, M, p} be given. The expected 
value of a FSHC given in (22) decreases with increase in the 
number of miners M. In particular, this value can converge to 1 
as M goes to infinity. 
Proof: It is immediately seen that 
  f,a
f,a
logX
0
M
pd
dM p
    
implying that the expected value given in (22) is a decreasing 
function of M. As M goes to infinity, the parameter defined in 
(21) goes to one. Thus, the expected value converges to one.  ■ 
The decoding process, i.e., Step 3 in Table V, can occupy the 
most computational time in a single hash cycle. In this decoding 
process, matrix-vector products are required, implying that the 
computational cost to run a single hash cycle can be modeled as 
O(mn). Each miner uses the same single computer in a given 
MG. Thus, we can assume that each miner only runs τ opera-
tions per second. This assumption makes us define an expected 
value of a block generation time as follows. 
Definition 10 – Block Generation Time: A MG{H, CBH, M, p} 
is given. Each miner is assumed to run τ operations per second. 
Then, the block generation time T can be defined as 
    1: X .MT O mn
  (24) 
Both Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 can indicate that the ex-
pected value in (24) is an increasing function of the code length 
n. We thus immediately conclude that the block generation time 
T is an increase function of n. 
VI. DISCUSSIONS ON ECCPOW 
We prepare this section to provide plentiful discussions on 
ECCPoW. To this end, we begin to define general properties of 
PoWs and explain how ECCPoW can have them. We introduce 
a new property that ECCPoW can only have. This new property 
makes ECCPoW become a solution to the problems such as M1 
and M2 which we have stated in Section I. 
We now begin to define properties below. 
P1. A puzzle has to be time-consuming, but it is easy to check 
whether a given solution is correct or not. 
P2. Any previous solution cannot be used to find a current 
solution. 
P3. A puzzle can be solved with overwhelming probability 1 if 
and only if miners follow the routines of PoW. 
P4. The difficulty of a puzzle can change. 
P5. A puzzle can be time-variant from block to block. 
The existing PoWs have the properties from P1 to P4. Let us 
begin to consider how bitcoin satisfies them. First, each puzzle 
is expected to be solved per 10 minutes. In contrast, validating a 
given solution can be instantly done. Second, SHA256 takes the 
block header to get its hash. The block header in Bitcoin has the 
timestamp field. Due to this timestamp field, the contexts of the 
current block header can be different to those of any previously 
mined blocks. Thus, any solutions given in these mined blocks 
are useless in finding a current solution. Thus, P2 holds. Third, 
the number of possible hashes is 2
256
 while the number of so-
lutions is about 2
(256 – L)
 where L is a pre-defined value ac-
cording to the difficulty of the provided block header. Thus, a 
possibility that a provided nonce is a solution is 2
L
. In the 
567,657
th
 block of bitcoin, L is 72. This is to imply that for this 
block, the probability that a randomly given nonce can be a 
solution is 2
-72
. Thus, all the miners have to follow the routines 
in Table I to solve a puzzle, meaning P3. Next, whenever 2016 
blocks are mined, the difficulty periodically changes, implying 
P4. Last, existing PoW does not hold P5. The reasons for this 
issue will be given after explaining how ECCPoW satisfies P5. 
Now, we begin to explain how ECCPoW can satisfy all the 
properties using the results established in the previous section.  
Corollary 2: ECCPoW can satisfy the first property P1.  
Proof: For a given nonce, we complete the verification whether 
this nonce is a solution or not by conducting the steps from Step 
1 to Step 4 in Table V. This verification requires a single con-
struction of a hash vector and a single execution of the decoder 
(10). In contrast, to solve an ECC puzzle, one has to do work by 
repeating them many times, as we have stated in Section V.   ■                                               
Corollary 3: ECCPoW can satisfy the second property P2. 
Proof: As we have stated in Definition 5, we construct an ECC 
puzzle using an ECCPGF in Definition 3. This ECCPGF takes a 
hash vector as its input and produces a binary word as its output. 
The decision is made based on this binary word. To make this 
hash vector, we put a given set of the block header with a nonce 
through SHA256. Similar to Bitcoin block header, our block 
header includes the timestamp field. Thereby, one cannot ef-
fortlessly create a particular hash vector even if one has the full 
knowledge of all the previous solutions, i.e., all the collection 
of the nonces each of which was a solution to mine a block in 
the past. This makes ECCPoW satisfy P2.                                ■                                                                        
Let us assume that there exists a knowledgeable miner who 
can solve ECC puzzles by referring to an input-output mapping 
table of ECCPoW without actually carrying out the decoding 
work. This miner can then mine blocks much faster than other 
honest miners can. To show the non-existence of such a miner 
in ECCPoW, we prepare Corollary 4. This corollary is to imply 
that all miners cannot but have to run the decoder to solve ECC 
puzzles. 
Corollary 4: ECCPoW satisfies the third property P3. 
Proof: Such a malicious miner can appear under an assumption 
that this miner has a mapping table that maps a given input to its 
corresponding output without actually carrying out the decod-
ing work (10). That is, he puts each hash vector into the decoder 
to find what this decoder returns. He then uses this known 
information to construct the mapping table. However, the 
number of hash vectors is 2
n
. For sufficiently large n, i.e. 
256 77
2 ~ 10 for 256n , we can easily see that this construction is 
impossible. Besides, this table depends on a PCM H, meaning 
that the mapping table is updated newly whenever H varies. As 
we have stated in the subsection IV.C, H can be set to vary from 
block to block. Thereby, whenever he aims to solve a new ECC 
puzzle, he has to construct a new mapping table. The above 
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assumption there exists the mapping table, we thus conclude, is 
invalid. Thereby, any miners in ECCPoW cannot but have to 
obey the routines in Table V to solve puzzles; this leads to the 
conclusion that ECCPoW satisfies P3.                                      ■ 
Now, we remind the discussions regarding Theorem 2. In the 
discussions, we have proven that an ECC puzzle can become 
easier as the code length n gets smaller. We then have empiri-
cally shown that the increase in n makes this puzzle more dif-
ficult to solve. They are to indicate that ECCPoW holds P4. 
Corollary 5: ECCPoW can satisfy the fourth property P4.  
Proof: It is clear; we thus omit it.                                             ■ 
A PCM H defines a mapping function of the decoder in (10). 
This decoder is used to define an ECCPGF in (9) which is used 
to construct an ECC puzzle. We conclude that this ECC puzzle 
can be a function of H. As we have mentioned in the subsection 
IV.C, we construct H using a previous hash, i.e., the i
th
 PCM is 
made using a hash of the (i–1)th block. Such a construction can 
make H time-variant from block to block, leading to that the 
ECC puzzle can also be time-variant from block to block. This 
discussion leads to a conclusion that ECCPoW holds P5 below. 
Corollary 6: ECCPoW can satisfy the fifth property P5. 
Proof: It is clear; we thus omit it.                                             ■ 
We now prepare to provide discussions how ECCPoW can 
be a solution to the problems such as i) M1 the re-centralization 
of the mining markets and ii) M2 the huge energy consumption 
for mining. As miners mine new blocks continuously, an infi-
nite number of PCMs are constructed. Hence, we cannot count 
how many the number of PCMs is required in advance. Also, 
we cannot expect what PCMs will be generated. We remind the 
example given in [25], showing that there is no ASIC-LDPC 
decoder to support the infinite number of PCMs. By combining 
this example with the fact that there is an infinite number of 
PCMs are required, we thus conclude that the LDPC decoder in 
ECCPoW is operated by either graphical processing units or 
CPUs. This is the fundamental reason that ECCPoW becomes 
the solution remediating the aforementioned problems M1 and 
M2 which we have stated in Section I. This is the most re-
markable contribution of ECCPoW. 
We end this section by providing a reason that SHA based 
PoW does not hold P5. We consider SHA256 as a puzzle gen-
eration function (PGF) in Bitcoin because it is used to generate 
a puzzle. This PGF is fixed regardless of the height of a block 
that miners aim to mine. The puzzle made using a fixed PGF is 
not time-variant at all, leading to that such a puzzle cannot hold 
P5. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
PoW is fundamental to public blockchains, as it can be used 
to prohibit an unauthorized modification of mined blocks. For 
existing PoWs, ASIC mining devices have been introduced and 
used to mine blocks. The usage of such devices can cause the 
problems such as M1 and M2 that we have stated in Section I. 
In this paper, as a solution to these problems, we proposed a 
new proof-of-work using error-correction codes which we call 
ECCPoW. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
in which a decoder of LDPC codes is applied to the consensus 
part of blockchain. Specifically, we combined this decoder with 
SHA256 to construct a composite function named as ECCPGF 
(9). We used ECCPGF to define a corresponding ECC puzzle 
(11) and provided the routines to solve a given ECC puzzle. 
We also studied the behavior of the expected value of the 
number of hash cycles for solving a given ECC puzzle. We 
showed that this value can be either increased or decreased as 
varying the code length, the size of a hash vector taken by the 
decoder, and the number of miners. Indeed, we discussed how 
ECCPoW can satisfy the five properties defined in Section VI, 
which shows the value of ECCPoW as a general PoW. 
As we have reviewed in Section III, there is no ASIC decoder 
to support an infinite number of LDPC codes. By motivated this 
survey, we intended to vary the codes from block to block. As a 
result, we made ECCPGF time-variant, meaning that its map-
ping function can vary from block to block. This leads to the 
time-variant property P5 defined in Section VI. This is the most 
innovative part of ECCPoW in repressing the advent of ASICs, 
implying that the problems caused from the usage of ASICs can 
be solved using our ECCPoW. 
We have implemented ECCPoW and forked two blockchains 
such as Bitcoin and Ethereum by replacing their consensus with 
the implemented ECCPoW. We name these forked versions as 
BTC-ECC and ETH-ECC, respectively. All of the source codes 
including ECCPoW, BTC-ECC and ETH-ECC can be availa-
ble in a GitHub site [34]. We have also provided manuals that 
shows how to install them, how to compile them and how to run. 
We believe that anyone can easily operate their own BTC-ECC 
or ETH-ECC by following these manuals. We believe that this 
site can be the first repository that makes people in the er-
ror-correction codes community get involved in the blockchain 
community. 
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